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Corporate governance and the theory of the firm: a re-assessment of 
shareholder primacy in the light of limited liability and the position of creditors 
 
Abstract 
The neoclassical theory of the firm presents an impressive analysis in which the 
primacy of owners’ interests is asserted.  It offers powerful insights into the 
contracting and monitoring challenges that arise when owners, as principals, delegate 
control to executive managers, their agents.  This perspective has had a major impact 
on debates regarding corporate governance and upon programs of corporate 
governance reform, especially in the wake of various corporate ‘scandals’.  However, 
through an examination of the nature of the limited liability corporation and, in 
particular, the position of creditors, this paper argues that the abstract theory of the 
firm should not be taken to imply that shareholders are the only party whose interests 
currently count in conventional systems of corporate governance.  In this way, the 
paper seeks to disturb the notion of shareholder primacy, pure and simple, thus 
opening up possibilities for other analyses of the limited liability corporation; and it 
also highlights for business ethicists the significance of trade creditors and finance 
creditors whose interests should be recognized and considered. 
 
 2 
Corporate governance and the theory of the firm: a re-assessment of 
shareholder primacy in the light of limited liability and the position of creditors 
 
Introduction 
Any theory of the firm carries with it a set of assumptions, explicit or implicit, about 
the governance of the firm – perhaps in relation to how governance is to be practiced 
but, more fundamentally, about in whose interests it should be established and 
directed. 
The upsurge of academic interest in corporate governance has tended to focus on the 
relationship between the company and its shareholders (stockholders), as have policy 
debates and initiatives.  Public discourse on practical corporate governance is 
consistent with, and indeed has been influenced by, the neoclassical theory of the firm 
(Blair, 1998), in particular its identification and analysis of ‘moral hazard’ within an 
agency theoretic analysis (see Hendry, 2001, p.161).1  However, as explained below, 
groups other than shareholders also have a strong claim to be recognized in 
discussions of corporate governance.  While some have written about governance in 
the context of a multi-stakeholder theory of the firm (e.g. Freeman & Evan, 1990; see 
Hendry, 2001 for a critique of such attempts), this paper complements recent debates 
by examining the position of creditors in corporate governance as a means of 
disturbing current conceptions of shareholder primacy.2  This has significant 
implications for business ethics, because certain positions antithetical to a ‘fully 
formed’ or thoroughgoing ethical analysis of business3 are premised on what I seek to 
demonstrate is an ill-founded understanding of the nature of the position of 
shareholders with respect to the governance of the firm. 
                                                 
1
 In doing this they are focusing on the divorce of ownership and control famously identified by Berle 
& Means (1932). 
2
 At a basic level, creditors can be divided into trade creditors and finance creditors.  Trade credit 
constitutes the single largest source of short-term funds for many companies (Rigby, 2002, p.75).  
Finance credit is, broadly speaking, the provision of funds in the form of loans etc, on which the 
borrower pays a rate of interest.  What they have in common is that they have a fixed claim to the 
payment of the principal amount plus any associated interest.  Unlike equity shareholders, whose 
rewards as residual claimants are variable with no entitlement to a return (Maitland, 2001), they do not 
receive extra rewards if the company does well; nor do they lose their right to payment if the company 
does badly.  Furthermore, both are voluntary creditors.  Generally speaking, the points I shall make 
apply to involuntary creditors too, such as many victims of torts committed by companies (Davies, 
2002).  However, some of the points, particularly where I discuss how creditors might protect 
themselves, apply only to voluntary creditors. 
3
 Cf. writing on the so-called ‘business case’ for ethics, where congruence with the financial interests 
of shareholders is the focus of attention.  (For a review of the empirical evidence see, for example, 
Orlitsky et al., 2003.) 
 3 
The paper is structured as follows.  The first section introduces the topic of corporate 
governance, highlighting features and issues of significance for the focus of this paper 
and reviewing some of the arguments in favour of the primacy of shareholders.  The 
second section describes some of the ways in which the interests of the creditors of 
limited liability companies are protected, paying particular attention to the those 
features that relate to corporate governance.  The third section then discusses the 
implications of a recognition of the position of creditors in relation to the governance 
of firms incorporated with limited liability.  The fourth and final section presents the 
conclusions. 
 
On corporate governance and the primacy of shareholders 
Corporate governance clearly raises ethical issues and, particularly when discussed in 
response to perceived ethical failures or ‘scandals’, entails an ethical agenda of some 
sort.  However, as a public policy issue is a comparatively recent phenomenon, dated 
by many to the establishment in May 1991 of The Committee on the Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury, 1993).  This was set up by the Financial 
Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange, and the accountancy profession in 
the UK in response to ‘some well-publicized major scandals involving fraud and the 
sudden collapse of a number of companies shortly after receiving clean audit 
opinions’ (Rutteman, 1993, p.57).4  The publication of the Cadbury Report in 1992 
represents a landmark in modern corporate governance, not only in the UK5 but 
internationally,6 prompting widespread use of a term – even in languages other than 
English  (Wymeersch, 1993) – that previously had little currency.7  Academics are 
often criticized for ignoring real-world concerns, but research on corporate 
governance has increased dramatically, and the last decade of the twentieth century 
‘saw the emergence of corporate governance as a growing field of study and research 
in universities and business schools around the world’ (Stiles & Taylor, 2001, p.v).   
                                                 
4
 Enron and its well known successors represent just the most recent in a succession of waves of 
concern (or moral panic) about business corporations which can be traced at last as far back as the 
nineteenth century. 
5
 Fisher & Lovell (2006) – a business ethics text – provides a useful overview of developments in 
corporate governance in the UK subsequent to the Cadbury Report. 
6
 Along with the OECD Principles it has influenced many corporate governance codes across the world 
(Mallin, 2004). 
7
 Midgley (1982) and Tricker (1984) are rare examples of pre-Cadbury books that contain the term in 
their title. 
 4 
Not surprisingly, particularly given its relatively recent emergence as a focus of 
attention, corporate governance has been defined in a variety of ways (Keasey et al., 
1997), some of them not altogether satisfactory.  Sternberg (1998) argues, for 
example, that the term itself has broader application than that to which it is generally 
taken to refer.  She makes the point that corporate governance is about corporations 
and hence is not about all businesses and, more important, is about enterprises other 
than businesses too, since the corporate form is used more widely, for example by 
charities.  As Davies (2002) notes, the company is one of the mechanisms made 
available by the state for the carrying on of business, but not all companies need to be 
formed with a view to making a profit.8 
However, even though it is clear from their discussions that they have in mind 
business corporations, the definitions proffered by some authors do not themselves 
fall foul of Sternberg’s criticism.  For example, Cadbury (1993, p.46) writes that 
corporate governance ‘in its broadest sense takes in the whole framework within 
which companies operate’; and Monks & Minow (2001, p.1) define corporate 
governance as ‘the relationship among various participants in determining the 
direction and performance of corporations’.  Nevertheless, for the purposes of this 
paper I will deal with Sternberg’s point by simply making explicit what is implicit in 
the corporate governance debates to which she refers; when I refer to corporate 
governance, I have in mind business corporations.   
Having delineated the scope of the application of the term for this paper, it is 
appropriate to comment a little more on the content of corporate governance.  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, attempts at definition are marked by difference and vagueness.  As 
Keasey et al. (1997) comment, different writers draw very different boundaries of the 
subject.  However, a useful distinction, applicable to most if not all definitions of 
corporate governance, is made by Tricker, who distinguishes governance from the 
management of a company: ‘If management is about running business; governance is 
about seeing that it is run properly’ (Tricker, 1984, p.6).  This simple contrast nicely 
brings out the ‘oversight’ aspect of corporate governance, the responsibility for which 
in the case of a particular company might be taken to fall most obviously to the board 
of directors, but which also – in a more general sense – lies with other parties, 
                                                 
8
 This applies especially, but not exclusively, to companies limited by guarantee. 
 5 
including the authorities responsible for setting and administering the framework 
within which companies operate. 
This begs the question of in whose interest the oversight is exercised, particularly by 
directors.  Occasionally, approaches to corporate governance appear to be quite 
flexible about this, perhaps reflecting differences of emphasis internationally.  For 
example, Prentice (1993, p.25) states that the debate above corporate governance ‘at 
its broadest level involves the issue of the relationship between the stakeholders in a 
company and those who manage its affairs (the board of directors)’ (emphasis added).  
In their well known text on corporate governance, Monks & Minow (2001, p.1), 
without using the term ‘stakeholder’, seem to be similarly disposed, for they begin by 
defining corporate governance as ‘the relationship among various participants in 
determining the direction and performance of corporations’.  They mention, inter alia, 
employees, customers, suppliers and creditors – the latter being the focus of this 
paper.  However, they also refer to the three ‘legs’ of the corporate ‘tripod’ of 
‘primary’ or ‘direct’ participants as the shareholders, the management (led by the 
CEO) and the board of directors; and it is this ‘tripod’, particularly the agency 
relationships within it, that forms the focus of their book, with other participants, such 
as employees and creditors, subsequently neglected.   
In so identifying the three ‘legs’ of their ‘tripod’, Monks & Minow are acting in 
accordance with the advice of Klein & Coffee (1988, p.118) that the ‘formal structure 
for control and operation of a corporation can best be described by reference to three 
basic groups – shareholders, directors, and officers’.  Moreover, this is consistent with 
most conventional views of corporate governance where, whatever the particular 
definition chosen, it is taken for granted to be about the relationship between 
shareholders and the company or, more commonly, between shareholders and 
directors.9  In interviews in the UK, Stiles & Taylor (2001, p.123) found, perhaps not 
surprisingly, that directors themselves ‘claimed that they acted in the interests of 
shareholders’.   
However, as Boatright (1999) notes, notwithstanding the confidence of the directors 
whom Stiles & Taylor interviewed, debate rages – at least in some quarters – over the 
                                                 
9
 Sternberg, whose argument about the applicability of the term ‘corporate governance’ was mentioned 
earlier, writes that it refers exclusively to ‘ways of ensuring that corporate actions, assets and agents are 
directed at achieving the corporate objectives established by the corporation’s shareholders’ 
(Sternberg, 1998, p.20, emphasis added).   
 6 
nature of the corporation.  The primacy of the interests of shareholders, usually 
interpreted as the pursuit of profits or (in more modern parlance) ‘shareholder value’, 
is taken for granted by many business people and other commentators; and finance 
textbooks, for example, rarely, if ever, argue for the claim that the objective of the 
firm is to maximize shareholder wealth (Boatright, 1999).  However, there are 
significant debates over whether shareholders should be accorded primacy.10  There 
are also different arguments for why they should.  Both legal and economic arguments 
tend to be drawn upon when the issue is discussed.11   
Perhaps the commonest justification for an exclusive shareholder orientation in 
corporate governance is that the shareholders are the owners.  This opinion may at 
best be useful ‘shorthand’, but as an argument it has serious deficiencies.  It is 
certainly not the case that a shareholder owns some proportion of the net assets of the 
business, nor even that the shareholders as a group own them; ‘as a matter of law a 
shareholder (even the sole shareholder) of a corporation does not own the assets 
devoted to the business of the corporation … the corporation owns the assets’ (Klein 
& Coffee, 1988, p.108; see also Iwai (2007) for an extended analysis).  In this 
understanding is embodied the notion that the company is a legal person separate 
from its shareholders, which ‘is fundamental to the conceptual structure of company 
law’ (Davies, 2002, p.9).  Instead, the shareholders own only shares of stock of the 
corporation (Klein & Coffee, 1988). 
However, property rights theory, which says that the corporation is the private 
property of the stockholders (Boatright, 1999, p.170), can be built on the basis of 
shareholder ownership of stock.  For example, Sternberg (1998, p.21) writes that ‘the 
reason why corporate governance refers solely to shareholders, and not to 
stakeholders, is because corporations are the property of their shareholders in 
aggregate; corporations are owned by, and are created to service the objective of, their 
shareholders’.  However, although the rights that shareholders possess might make 
them look like owners, according to the law ‘strictly speaking, shareholders do not 
                                                 
10
 E.g normative stakeholder theory. 
11
 Where legal matters are referred to in this paper, they will tend to refer to British or US law.  
Although US law depends, to some extent, on which state is being considered, company law 
developments in the US followed the British path more closely than did countries in mainland Europe 
(Tricker, 1984), and the parallels in the economic and legal systems of the UK and US mean that there 
are still significant resonances.  These parallels or resonances are sufficient for the level of argument of 
this paper. 
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own their company’ (Lucas, 1998, p.65), ‘despite frequent statements to the contrary 
by corporate managers’ (Kay, 1996, p.11).   
An alternative line of reasoning which has similar implications to those of property 
rights theory, but which avoids its legal weaknesses,12 is contractual theory.  This 
holds that ‘the firm results from the property rights and the right of contract of every 
corporate constituency and not from those of shareholders alone’ (Boatright, 1999, 
p.171).  Thus a firm, including a corporation, is sometimes held to be a ‘nexus of 
contracts’.  In itself, this does not lead to the primacy of shareholders.  There is a 
further argument that depends on the nature of the shareholders’ relationship with the 
company.  Participants such as creditors have a ‘fixed claim’ upon the corporation, 
whereas the position of shareholders is by its very nature ‘residual’.  It is this that 
forms the basis for claiming their primacy and not, for example, their role as a capital 
provider. 
The crux of the financial argument is that shareholders differ from other 
constituencies by virtue of being residual risk-bearers and that as such, 
they have peculiar problems of contracting that are best met by having 
control.  (Boatright, 1999, p.170) 
This might look like an ethical argument, and it can certainly be propounded as one; 
the vulnerability of shareholders, given their ‘residual’ position, entitles them to 
control.  However, whatever the merits of this argument, Klein & Coffee (1988, p.42) 
note that shareholders, because they hold the residual, ‘are more likely to be interested 
in and to have control of the firm than are the holders of the debt, or fixed claim’.  In 
other words, it is more worthwhile to shareholders for them to have control than it is 
for creditors, since creditors are entitled to no more than their fixed claim.  The 
structure of the game or implicit bargaining between different parties is such that 
overall control falls almost naturally to the shareholders.  Because of the incentives 
and risks they face as residual claimants, they will be, in effect, the ‘highest bidders’ 
for voting rights (Maitland, 2001, p.132) and so governance structures and 
mechanisms will be set up in their favor. 
Such an outcome might be argued to serve the public interest too, not just 
shareholders’.  Assuming that maximum wealth creation is the goal of business 
activity (Boatright, 1999), the corporation should be governed in the interest of the 
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 Given the current state of company law. 
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group with the strongest incentives for wealth-maximizing decisions, which in turn 
should be to the benefit of society as a whole (Mallin, 2004).13 
However, contractual theory does miss one essential feature of corporate law.  Davies 
(2002, pp. 6-7) writes that: 
it is of the utmost importance to note that the law treats shareholders not 
just as a group of people with contractual rights of various sorts against 
the company but also as its ‘members’….  To the Victorian drafters of the 
companies legislation it was as natural to vest ultimate control of the 
company in the shareholders (members), at least as the default rule, as it is 
still to us to think that the members of a cricket club or a students’ union 
should be the ultimate repository of authority in those organizations. 
As Tricker (1984) notes, under British company law the primary duty of the directors 
is to the company and, since the company is made up of the members, this duty lies to 
the body of shareholders as a whole – and, as a primary duty, nowhere else.14  While 
demonstrating the limited strength of some other arguments for shareholder primacy, 
this might appear to rule out other stakeholder groups from serious consideration in 
terms of corporate governance.  However, as shown below, it does not, on its own, do 
justice to the position of creditors at least. 
In conclusion, although there are some definitions of corporate governance that 
appear to take a stakeholder viewpoint,15 most approaches quickly, or without any 
apparent consideration, concentrate upon shareholders and the protection of their 
interests vis-à-vis the board of directors (and executive management).  This has been 
the focus of virtually all recent debate and action with regard to corporate governance 
reform.  However, upon examination, the arguments for this exclusive focus are, as 
shown earlier in this section, of variable quality.  In particular, simplistic notions or 
slogans about ownership ride roughshod over the legal subtleties of the corporate 
arena and risk erroneously closing down legitimate areas of debate.  Indeed, when it 
comes to governance, Davies (2002) reminds us that company law16 has historically 
                                                 
13
 Equating wealth maximization with shareholder wealth maximization clearly involves subsidiary 
arguments, e.g. in relation to issues such as the efficiency of markets (and hence welfare significance of 
prices), externalities, and whether shareholders are really the only residual claimants (cf. employees 
who make firm-specific investments, for example – see Blair, 1998). 
14
 This notion of shareholders as members is perhaps a somewhat neglected one that would reward, in 
the context of business ethics, some further consideration.  However, that is beyond the scope of the 
current paper. 
15
 In which case creditors would be part of the corporate governance agenda. 
16
 He is referring to the UK but, by extension, it applies to similar regimes. 
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been concerned with more than just shareholders and the board; it has dealt with the 
activities of three main groups: 
• the shareholders (or members) of the company; 
• its directors and, to a lesser extent, its senior managers (whether they are directors 
or not); and 
• its creditors. 
The law seeks to regulate relations between and within the three elements of what he 
refers to as the “traditional trinity” (Davies, 2002, p.6).17  The next section considers 
the usually ignored third element of this trinity, the creditors.  It begins by looking at 
the historical origins of limited liability companies and their regulation. 
 
Limited liability and the protection of creditors 
‘The joint-stock company, with limited liability for its shareholders was an elegantly 
simple and eminently successful development of the mid-nineteenth century.’ 
(Tricker, 1984, p.2).  In the UK, prior to the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844, 
introduced by William Ewart Gladstone when he was President of the Board of 
Trade’ (Davies, 2002, p.1), the creation of a corporation required an act of Parliament, 
but the 1844 Act provided aspiring promoters with a cheap and easy means of 
incorporation (Edwards, 1989, p.101).  It is conventionally understood that it was not 
until the Limited Liability Act 1855 that shareholders in companies were granted the 
protection of limited liability, with the privilege not extended to banks and insurance 
until 1858 and 1862 respectively (Page, 1982).  However, the Winding Up18 Act of 
1844 had provided for the first time that remedies of creditors of companies only 
extended to company property and not that of shareholders (Keay & Walton, 2003).19  
Moreover, as Klein & Coffee (1988, p. 139) point out, limited liability is a corollary 
of the concept of the corporation as an entity – it is the corporation that incurs the 
debt, not the shareholders.  Indeed, strictly speaking the ‘limited liability company’ is 
a misnomer (Davies, 2002, p.11), since creditors’ rights can be asserted to the full 
                                                 
17
 This ‘trinity’ can be contrasted with Monk & Minow’s (2001) ‘tripod’ of shareholders, 
management/CEO and board of directors, mentioned earlier. 
18
 Winding up of companies is often called liquidation.   
19
 After 1862 such provisions were incorporated in companies legislation (Keay & Walton, 2003). 
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against the company’s assets, even if they cannot be fulfilled.  It is the liability of the 
shareholders that is limited, not that of the company.  
The crucial feature for creditors is that doing business with a limited liability 
company increases the risk of non-payment when compared, ceteris paribus, with an 
unincorporated business such as a sole trader or a partnership, because the creditor 
does not have recourse to the personal assets of the people involved in the business of 
the company– the members (shareholders) and the directors (except in exceptional 
circumstances). 
The widespread availability of incorporation with limited liability can be argued to 
have had an enormous impact on the mobilization of risk capital and hence economic 
growth.  However, in response to the risks brought about by limited liability, 
legislatures have attempted to provide some degree of protection for creditors, to 
reduce the likelihood of companies not paying their debts.  The frameworks or 
templates of ‘default’ rules (Maitland, 2001) vary from country to country (or from 
state to state, within the US) and have changed over time, but, in terms of the 
provisions of company law, they can be divided broadly into financial and 
informational measures.20 
The financial protection of creditors could involve requiring companies to put aside a 
sum of money to cover what they owe, but, if significant, that would ‘make the 
corporate form very unattractive for business’ and undermine some of the benefits of 
both limited liability and a credit-based financial system (Davies, 2002, p.84).  
Instead, attempts have been made using capital maintenance rules to prevent the 
assets being run down inappropriately, by restricting payments to shareholders.  So, 
for example, until relatively recently UK law prohibited a company from purchasing 
its own shares, and even now re-purchases are subject to a prescribed procedure 
which aims to safeguard creditors’ rights (Davies, 2002).  Similarly, capital reduction 
schemes are ‘hedged about’ with protections for the creditors (Davies, 2002, p.91). 
Dividends have been restricted in a related fashion, with the general rule in the UK 
being that dividends may only be paid out of profits.  Creditors are not the only 
intended beneficiaries of this, for one of the aims in the nineteenth century was to 
prevent investors being fooled into thinking that a company was doing better than it 
                                                 
20
 If protection proves insufficient and creditors find themselves in trouble with an insolvent company, 
bankruptcy/insolvency law is available – see below. 
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was.21  However, the convention of prudence or conservatism in financial accounting 
and reporting was developed to place a restraint on the declaration of profits and 
hence the distribution of dividends to shareholders, thus – other things being equal – 
providing for greater capital maintenance to the potential benefit of creditors.  One of 
the challenges is to ensure that the definition and hence calculation of profit is 
sufficiently robust to give the rule some purchase on company finances.  In nineteenth 
century Britain, for example, when it was common practice to distribute as dividend 
100% of the current year’s profits, the profit might be calculated to equal the intended 
dividend; varying – or even eliminating – the depreciation charge was one method of 
achieving this (Edwards, 1989). 
Dividend rules have varied over time and from place to place.  The law of dividend is 
very divided in the US, ‘with some states requiring only that the dividend not render 
the corporation forseeably [sic] insolvent and others that it come out of a carefully 
defined fund on the corporation’s balance sheet’ (Klein & Coffee, 1988, p.142). 
Although it is not entirely satisfactory, the ‘doctrine of capital maintenance’ (Davies, 
2002, p. 87) can plausibly be argued to protect creditors, at least to some extent.  
However, it is only a partial solution.  Not only is it difficult to find an appropriate 
method of putting it into practice, but it does little or nothing to prevent a company’s 
capital being eroded by a succession of losses (Edwards, 1989). 
Although there are signs of significant and rapid global convergence, not all 
jurisdictions have equally stringent accounting and disclosure demands in return for 
the privilege of limited liability.  However, company law does provide some help to 
creditors when it comes to losses, in the sense that there are financial reporting 
requirements laid upon companies that do not apply to, say, sole traders.  Creditors 
can obtain that information and act accordingly, choosing either not to trade with the 
company or to adjust their terms of trade – perhaps even trying to deal only on a cash 
basis.  Accounting information is not perfect – it may be somewhat out of date for 
example – but it is not the only source of information available; creditors can also 
look to credit rating agencies, their own experience of the company, or take account 
of views ‘on the grapevine’.  The essential point is that creditors can, at least to some 
extent, look after themselves.  At the very least, the law puts them on notice by 
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 Dividends can act as informational signals, as highlighted by modern finance theory. 
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requiring incorporated businesses to append ‘ltd’, ‘plc’, ‘inc.’ or some other such 
suffix to their name to warn of the presence of limited liability. 
Thus, although the law attempts to provide a certain level of protection, creditors can 
– if they decide to do business with the company, which is their option – attempt to 
obtain greater protection, if they think it is worth having.22  There are various methods 
of doing this, including the following: 
o In the case of a potential trade creditor, retaining ownership, i.e. effectively 
allowing the company use of goods but without giving up title on delivery.  
Thus goods might be supplied to a retailer on consignment (effectively ‘sale or 
return’) or a reservation of title clause (a so-called ‘Romalpa clause’) might be 
included in the contract of supply.  In effect, the supplier reduces or eliminates 
the period of trade credit. 
o Finance creditors (e.g. banks) often wish to secure their loan against company 
assets (sometimes referred to as ‘collateral’), so that if the company goes into 
liquidation (see below), there is an asset or assets specially identified to meet 
their claim (hopefully in full).  Alternatively, a creditor might take a floating 
charge.  Without such security, a bank might be unwilling to provide a loan, or 
only at a higher rate of interest.  This move is also open to, but less commonly 
employed by, trade creditors.  Secured creditors have not only a contractual 
right against debtors, but also a proprietary right in relation to some or all of 
the debtor’s assets (Keay & Walton, 2003, pp.12-13). 
o A creditor might ask for a personal guarantee from directors.  This pierces, at 
least in part, the veil of limited liability, and is likely to be used in the case of 
small or medium-sized owner-managed companies.23  Again, it is quite 
common for banks to ask for this, but it can also be used by trade creditors. 
o Creditors, particularly banks, might seek to place various restrictions on the 
company’s activities for the period that the credit is outstanding.  For example, 
there might be covenants to limit the company’s subsequent borrowing, or a 
contractual clause might restrict the ability to pay dividends, in a tighter and 
clearer manner, than the general provisions of the law. 
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 Greater protection, whatever form it might take, is likely to cost something in some way. 
23
 Even if such guarantees effectively removed the benefits of incorporation with limited liability, there 
might still remain tax advantages from using that form (Klein & Coffee, 1988). 
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o Trade creditors can sell, or ‘factor’, their debts to a third party – though if the 
customer is perceived as risky they might be able to do so only at a deep 
discount. 
o Finally, creditors might simply reflect the perceived risk of extending credit to 
a particular company in the prices or interest charged (Maitland, 2001).  
Mention was made earlier of the levying of higher interest on unsecured than 
on secured loans.  Similarly, trade creditors might charge higher prices to 
customers perceived to entail greater risk of non-payment (Ross et al., 2007).  
Creditors can thus help themselves, using commercial law and other means, to 
supplement the protection afforded by company law.  However, sometimes a 
company is unable to meet all its obligations to creditors.  In such circumstances the 
law of bankruptcy – or ‘insolvency’ as it is called when referring to corporations in 
the UK – comes into play. 
Insolvency law is generally very complicated, but for the purposes of this paper its 
intricacies are of limited significance.24  It is generally invoked when a corporate 
debtor is in serious financial difficulty.  Sometimes an attempt will be made at 
reorganization (or “rehabilitation”) of the company, but in cases of “straight” 
bankruptcy or insolvency the company will be liquidated and the cash fund thus 
raised distributed in accordance with strict procedures.  Creditors, of course, rank 
before shareholders (who are likely to receive nothing) in the distribution, and secured 
creditors generally have their claims met before unsecured creditors, though in some 
countries the legislature has given ‘certain unsecured debts (mainly employees’ 
claims to wages – to a modest extent – and certain claims of the public authorities) 
statutory priority over the floating, though not the fixed, charge’ (Davies, 2002, p.76).  
However, whatever the complications, in essence it is the case that ‘When 
corporations are in distress, creditors take control from shareholders and the creditors’ 
interests become primary until the firm recovers.’ (Boatright, 1999, p.178).25   
 
                                                 
24
 Klein & Coffee (1988, p.219), for example, refer to US federal bankruptcy law as ‘exceedingly 
complex’.  In the UK, the law relating to the insolvency of companies used to be part of the companies 
legislation but is now to be found mainly, though not entirely, in the Insolvency Act 1986.  This brings 
it together with personal bankruptcy (Davies, 2002).  However, notwithstanding the complexity, it is 
the intentions and general principles that matter for the argument of this paper. 
25
 This is broadly in accordance with creditors’ bargain theory, which argues that the goal is to 
maximize the amount that creditors receive (Keay & Walton, 2003). 
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Discussion 
The modern corporate form has enabled the growth of large organizations with widely 
dispersed shareholdings, in which the agency issues that arise from the divorce of 
ownership and control per the neoclassical theory of the firm are likely to loom large.  
To that extent, the focus of corporate governance debates and policy initiatives on 
shareholder interests – particularly in the wake of corporate scandals such as Enron, 
WorldCom and Tyco, in which managerial hubris and greed loomed large – is entirely 
reasonable and appropriate.  However, a review of the nineteenth century origins of 
joint stock companies and the development of an associated body of law demonstrate 
that this is not the only issue of significance in relation to corporate governance.  Not 
only for large corporations, where there might be a divorce of ‘ownership’26 and 
control per Berle & Means (1932), but also in relation to the smallest of incorporated 
businesses, there is the issue of limited liability.  Many stakeholders are protected by 
particular branches of law (e.g. consumer law, labor law), but it is noteworthy that 
creditors – who can also make use of commercial law and practises to safeguard their 
interests – are protected by company law itself.27  Davies (2002) similarly notes that 
the relations between companies and their creditors are covered by general 
commercial law because it makes no difference that a company, as opposed to an 
unincorporated business, is involved, but he goes on to state: 
Company law addresses only creditor issues which are unique to 
companies.  In the main, such issues arise out of the adoption of ‘limited 
liability’ or because the taking of security by creditors gives them a 
potential role in the governance of companies. (Davies, 2002, p.8) 28 
In effect, a degree of protection for creditors is effected by regulating the relationship 
between the company and its members, for example by restricting the circumstances 
in which shareholders can be paid a dividend and, when the company is insolvent, 
removing control from them and those who are deemed to act in their interest (the 
board of directors).  As explained at the end of the previous section, when a company 
becomes insolvent, the focus for corporate governance shifts from shareholders to 
creditors. 
                                                 
26
 See the earlier comments on shareholders as ‘owners’. 
27
 Notwithstanding the UK Insolvency Act 1986, I am continuing to bracket corporate insolvency law 
with company law, which is where its origins lie. 
28
 Coffee (2006) argues that the corporate governance debate has also ignored the professional agents 
of the board and the shareholders, who inform and advise them.  However, his interest is in the 
responsibilities of these parties in relation to the bilateral relationship that dominates the current 
governance literature, rather than in the legitimate interests of a third principal party, the creditors. 
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This analysis suggests that there is not one but two possible modes of governance for 
a limited liability company.  First, in what I term ‘normal’ mode, shareholders’ 
interests are paramount, which – subject to agency problems and the objectives of the 
particular shareholders concerned – will involve a focus upon the firm’s positive 
residual or financial return.29  However, to operate in this normal mode, creditors’ 
fixed claims need to be capable of being met, failing which a company can be placed 
in what I term ‘distressed’ governance mode, where there is a prospect of a negative 
residual.  In this mode the company is governed in the interests of creditors, with 
shareholders hoping that there might be something left for them or that the company 
might eventually return to viability and hence normal governance mode. 
In distressed mode, the shareholders still own their shares and they are still members 
of the company, but governance is not oriented in their interests.  This implies that 
arguments for the primacy of shareholders in governance, when based on notions of 
ownership or membership, are inadequate or even erroneous.  According to this 
analysis, the residual claim arguments are more convincing; when the company is 
insolvent, there is not – at least as constituted according to legal definitions – a 
positive residual equity interest, and the creditors are bearing the risk because their 
fixed claims are vulnerable.  The focus for governance therefore becomes their 
interests.  A further implication of this argument is that Davies’ (2002) corporate 
governance trinity is superior to Monks & Minow’s tripod.30   
Of course, if – and only if – creditors’ fixed claims have been satisfied or adequately 
dealt with, a distressed company that has the prospects of being a going concern can 
once again be governed in the interests of shareholders.  It might then be argued that 
the satisfaction of creditors’ claims is itself in the interests of shareholders so that they 
can ‘get the company back’, and so there is a sense in which their interests might still 
be considered primary.  However, there are at least two problems with this view.  
First, the decisions that are taken when a firm is in administration are first and 
foremost made in the interests of the creditors; they are not aimed at maximizing the 
long-term expected value for shareholders, and there is likely to be a shift towards a 
                                                 
29
 I note that there are legal cases in the UK and the US which some commentators argue mean that 
companies do not  have to maximize profits.  I also note that, in a closely held corporation, where there 
in no divorce of ownership by shareholders and control by executive management, non-financial goals 
may have an important part to play, as Friedman (1970) acknowledges. 
30
 Davies brackets together management and the board, which are two of the separate ‘legs’ identified 
by Monks & Minow – who, of course, omit creditors, unlike Davies. 
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much more risk-averse and liquidity-friendly approach to decisions than would be in 
the interests of shareholders.  Second, although it is in the interests of shareholders 
that creditors of a financially distressed company are satisfied or at least pacified – so 
that, in a sense, shareholders are ‘in the wings’, waiting to take governance ‘center 
stage’ again – so also it is the case that creditors are ‘waiting in the wings’ when 
shareholders’ interests are apparently paramount, for when creditors’ interests are 
threatened, the nature of the governance of the company can be switched in their 
favour.   
Indeed, what determines which governance mode a company is in is, in essence, the 
issue of whether creditors’ fixed claims are being, or are likely to be, met in full.  
Thus there is a case for arguing that not only do they have a significant position in 
governance, but they actually have a fundamental one, even if that does not usually 
involve their participation or active consideration.  Moreover, the meeting of the fixed 
claims of creditors is, at least to some degree, a constraint upon the pursuit of 
shareholders’ interests in normal governance mode, a constraint written into company 
law - and like any constraint, it can be viewed as a degenerate objective (Tocher, 
1970) or overriding goal (Eilon, 1971).  Even if company law is not completely 
effective in protecting creditors’ fixed claims against the abuse or vagaries of 
incorporation with limited liability, the intention of the law is clear, particularly when 
the history of its development is considered.   
Finally, the possible tension between shareholder primacy and a stakeholder 
conception of corporate governance was briefly mentioned earlier in this paper.  
Whatever the merits of a stakeholder conception might or might not be, this paper has 
argued that a shareholder-only approach is inadequate for conceptualizing the 
corporate governance of limited liability companies.  Even within the conventional, 
‘Anglo-Saxon’ corporate governance approach shareholders are not, even now, the 
only stakeholder considered.  This is so – and justifiably so – because of the special 
privilege of general incorporation with limited liability vis-à-vis sole traders and 
partnerships.  Furthermore, although a stakeholder conception would enable creditors 
to be brought into the corporate governance picture, creditors qua creditors already 
warrant their place in an adequate conception of corporate governance.  They should 
not be forgotten, and the remembrance of them serves to place shareholders in a light 
different from that in which they are normally viewed. 
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Conclusion 
In some respects the ambition of this paper has been a modest one.  It has not sought, 
for example, to argue (as some have done) for a re-conceptualization of corporate 
governance in line with a stakeholder theory of the firm, which would involve arguing 
for such a theory.  However, to the extent that defenses against a more thoroughgoing 
analysis of the firm in ethical terms, such as stakeholder theory would allow, rely 
upon shareholder primacy, the paper has opened the way for such ethical analyses and 
related prescriptions by showing the shortcomings of some of the arguments upon 
which defenses against them tend to depend.  In particular, by paying attention to the 
position of creditors in the governance of conventional limited liability corporations 
(usually, if not always, forgotten by recent writers on corporate governance), it has 
shown that the institutional assumptions, upon which the neoclassical theory of the 
firm and the discourses it has influenced are based, are under-specified.  Two things 
are particularly important to recognize.  First, shareholders are not owners of a 
business in the way that sole traders or partners are; there are significant differences.  
Second, the position of creditors is fundamental to the origins and modern 
institutional form and regulation of the limited liability company.  A recognition of 
these features of the economic world should form part of any attempt to apply the 
abstract, neoclassical theory of the firm, notwithstanding its intellectual achievements, 
to understanding the governance of the modern corporation. 
The principal contribution of this paper is therefore not to replace shareholder 
primacy as such, but to disturb current conceptions of it and thus open the way for 
other analyses – though the paper has also developed arguments for seeing creditors, 
at least in some sense, as primary.  A secondary contribution is to highlight for the 
scholarly business ethics community that creditors – whether as suppliers of capital or 
as suppliers of goods and services – are a stakeholder group worth recognizing and 
considering. 
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